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INTRODUCTION

In Colegrove v. Green,' Justice Frankfurter warned the courts that
legislative apportionment was a "political thicket" they should not
3 the Supreme Court
enter.2 Nonetheless, beginning in Baker v. Carr,
became involved in apportionment under the aegis of the equal protection clause. Although criticized, the substantive standard it invoked,
"one person, one vote," 4 allowed the Court to steer clear of the political
thicket by quantitative rather than qualitative treatment of voters.
The Supreme Court's careful avoidance of political issues changed
with the recent case of Davis v. Bandemer,5 in which the Court held
that political gerrymandering, like racial gerrymandering,6 could violate the equal protection clause.1 Under Davis, unconstitutional political or racial gerrymandering consists of (1) legislative intent to draw

*Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A., Williams College, 1965; LL.B., Yale
University, 1968. I wish to thank Carl Auerbach and Chris Wonnell for their criticisms and
suggestions, some of which I've taken to heart, and others of which I undoubtedly should have.
1. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
2. Id. at 556.
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1963).
5. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
6. See white v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
7. Davis, 478 U.S. at 124-25 (plurality opinion) (a majority of the Court held that political
gerrymandering was not a nonjusticiable political question).
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voting boundaries based on the political or racial makeup of the districts; and (2) resulting dilution of a particular political or racial group's
votes."
With Davis, the Court has indeed entered the political thicket, a
trackless wilderness best left unexplored.9 Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Davis shared this view about political gerrymandering, but not about its racial counterpart. 10 I believe, as did the
majority of the Court," that political and racial gerrymandering present the same problems.
The Court's approach to gerrymandering raises two questions.
First, why does legislative intent matter? If some legislative schemes
"dilute" votes, and if this is a harm of constitutional import, what
difference does it make how the dilution came about? Why not just
order redistricting in a way that does not result in vote dilution? The
search for intent effectively condones diluted voting schemes not intended to affect the votes of a particular group, but nevertheless doing
so. Envision, for example, a computer program produced by a bipartisan, multiracial commission that manages to dilute votes even though
the legislative majority has no such intent. Why should such a scheme
pass constitutional muster when the result is diluted voting for a
particular group?
Second, why is vote dilution a constitutionally cognizable harm in
the first place? This question raises three interrelated subissues: (1)
What does "vote dilution" mean in a districting scheme that complies
with "one person, one vote"? (2) Is a focus on vote dilution normatively
attractive given our general constitutional structure? (3) Is vote dilution measurable in a judicially manageable way?

8. See id. at 14142 (plurality opinion) (establishing a pattern for courts to decide political
gerrymandering cases: assume discriminatory effect, find sufficient discriminatory intent to

constitute an equal protection violation, and then determine if the state has legitimate state
interests).
9. I am not alone in this regard. See, e.g., Alfange, Gerrymanderingand the Constitution:
Into the Thorns of the Thicket at Last, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 175; Lowenstein & Steinberg, The
Questfor Legislative Districtingin the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1 (1985); Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: PartisanGerrymanderingand JudicialRegulation of
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987); Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court,33 UCLA L. REv. 227 (1985); Comment, Davis v. Bandemer: Remedial Difficulties
in Political Gerrymandering,37 EMORY L.J. 443 (1988).

10. 478 U.S. at 144-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11.

Id. at 118-27 (plurality opinion).
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II.

THE FIRST QUESTION: WHY DOES LEGISLATIVE
INTENT MATTER?

An answer to the first question is hard to divine. If the effect of
a plan is constitutional, why should a motive to harm matter? If I
have a dozen identical candy bars to distribute to a dozen children,
try as I might to distribute inferior ones to black or Republican children, I cannot succeed. They may, of course, resent the attempt and
feel insulted by it. But no constitutional case of which I am aware
has ever turned on insulting motive alone. What would be the remedy?
The candy bars are, by hypothesis, identical.
Of course, certain distributive situations exist in which a given
distribution may be improper - and in constitutional law, unconstitutional - because of the distributor's motive. If I am distributing places
in line at a drinking fountain, then it is wrong for me to do so based
on race, e.g., "whites first." On the other hand, I act properly if I
base my distribution on alphabetical order or even flips of a coin, even
if all blacks happen to end up in the back of the line. How motive can
make an otherwise permissible distribution impermissible is a complex
12
and controversial topic that I have addressed in an earlier article.
But let us assume that motive does matter.
Unless better and worse ways exist for drawing district lines
like better and worse places in the line to the drinking fountain, and
unlike the distribution of identical candy bars - then motive is impotent and thus irrelevant. Therefore, we must assume that better and
worse ways to draw district lines do exist. Moreover, we must assume
that the worse ways are not unconstitutional if their dilutive effects
were not the motivating factor behind the legislative design.
How can motive affect whether a bad state of affairs is unconstitutional? The only answer I can come up with goes like this. First,
suppose that a districting rule designed to produce a particular benefit,
such as an administratively efficient districting scheme, is constitutionally permissible even though it produces vote dilution with respect to
Group X. In the constitutional calculus, the benefit of administrative
efficiency outweighs the cost of vote dilution. Second, suppose that
an alternative constitutionally permissible districting rule is designed
to respect the integrity of traditional political boundaries, again at the
cost of some vote dilution. Finally, suppose that a districting rule

12. See Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and
Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 21-23 (1981). But cf. A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 120-30, 220 (1987) (although an excellent attack on effects tests, the piece ignores why legislative motive matters in districting cases).
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designed specifically to dilute Group X's voting strength is constitutionally forbidden because over time, any coincidental benefits it might
produce at any given point, such as administrative efficiency or respect
for political boundaries, will be outweighed by the cost of the long
run dilution of Group X's voting strength.
If the legislature explicitly adopted the third proposition - "redraw
the district boundaries from time to time to produce as much dilution
of Group X's votes as is possible" - as its choice of districting schemes,
courts would overturn it. This is so because even if the legislative
scheme happened to produce efficient boundaries in a given year and
followed traditional political boundaries in another year, the legislation
would produce neither maximum efficiency nor maximum political integrity, as the other two rules would have.
The final step in the argument is this. At any one point in time,
a districting scheme may produce a state of affairs consistent with
both a permissible legislative goal (efficiency or political integrity),
and an impermissible legislative goal (vote dilution). Unless we look
at the present legislative motive behind the rule on the books (which
may mean the motive behind not repealing the rule), we cannot tell
what true "rule" the legislature is following. Hence, we cannot predict
what results the rule on the books will produce over time. The results
over time, rather than the results at any one point in time, determine
constitutional permissibility.
One can level a major objection at the preceding argument. Assume
that the legislature changes its mind from time to time in its decision
to draw district lines in response to efficiency or in response to political
integrity. If such changes coincidentally occurred when the old policy
ceased to dilute votes and the new policy caused vote dilution, nothing
unconstitutional would have transpired. Yet these same effects are
the premise for labeling the vote dilution rule unconstitutional. 13 Therefore, the argument must be incorrect.
I confess that this objection is serious and quite possibly fatal. In
the earlier article, I replied by suggesting that perhaps in our constitutional scheme the legislature may choose among basic values, and even
may choose compromises among them. Moreover, the legislature may
always change its mind and pursue a different basic value from that

13. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 21-22; see also Alexander, Introduction: Motivation
and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925, 928-29 (1978) [hereinafter Alexander, Moti.
vation and Constitutionality](recognizing the incongruity that a legislature could constitutionally
close swimming pools when blacks wanted to swim and open them when whites wanted to swim,
and at the same time, could not have a strict rule prohibiting blacks from using the pools).
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which it originally chose. But the legislature may not choose a value
beyond the permissible list, even if such a choice would produce effects
no different from those produced by the legislature constantly changing
its mind about which permissible value to pursue. 14 Now, the theory
may be wrong. If so, legislative motive itself cannot be material to
constitutionality. Only legislative effects would be material.
Someone might offer the following alternative theory in support
of requiring a vote diluting motive in addition to vote dilution itself.
Suppose the courts feel institutionally ill-equipped to assess whether
the good effects of a districting scheme (efficiency or political integrity)
outweigh the bad effects of vote dilution. If the legislature has been
motivated by the good effects, then the courts should assume that
those effects outweigh the bad ones. But if the legislature has been
motivated by the bad effects, the courts can no longer have confidence
that the good effects justify the districting scheme, and the courts
should strike it down.
The alternative theory, in which motive is no longer intrinsically
material to constitutionality, but is instead a relevant fact that forms
the basis of a conclusive presumption, has the following unattractive
consequence. In two different states, two identical districting plans
that produce identical effects differ in constitutional validity because
of different motives. This is so not because motive is material, but
because courts presume that good effects outweigh bad effects in one
but not the other, even though the effects in both are identical. But
where effects are identical, courts have no warrant to presume that
one set is justifiable and the other is not. 15 Of course, courts may have
less confidence that the effects in one state will remain justifiable in
the future. That, however, is the theory of the role of motive offered
above to which the present evidentiary theory of motive is an alternative.
Let us move on and assume that the materiality of a vote diluting
motive somehow can be established. The question remaining is whether
vote dilution other than numerical malapportionment is a constitutionally cognizable harm.

III. THE SECOND QUESTION: WHAT Is VOTE DILUTION AND
How Is IT HARMFUL?
What is vote dilution? Put differently, what is the ideal against
which vote dilution is identified and measured? Consider a state that
14. See Alexander, supranote 12; Alexander, Motivation and Constitutionality,supranote

13.
15. See Alexander, Motivation and Constitutionality, supra note 13, at 930-31 n.22.
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is 40% Republican. Is the ideal for that state one in which (a) 40% of
the legislators are Republican; (b) one in which 100% are Democrats
with a 40% Republican constituency; or (c) one in which 40% of the
Republican political program is enacted? Perhaps vote dilution is only
relevant for majority parties. Thus, in an ideally districted state, the
Democrats will get 60% of the seats, or 100%, or get their entire
program enacted, or perhaps only 60%.
We need a theory of ideal political representation, and not just for
a constituency that votes in one-dimensional blocs, such as by political
party. This theory must serve a constituency in which individuals may
align with Democrats on one issue, with blacks on another, with the
machinists' union on a separate issue, and with persons of political
charisma on still others. What is vote dilution for such individuals?
A.

Two Conceptions of Democratic Design

I want to identify two conceptions of democracy pertinent to fashioning an ideal districting plan. These two conceptions are borrowed
from Ronald Dworkin's recent article on political equality. 16 The first
conception is what Dworkin calls the dependent conception of democracy, 17 but what I shall call the substantive conception of democracy.
In brief, the substantive conception of democracy would have us draw
district lines by reference to an ideal set of outcomes. s Thus, the
theory requires the institutional design empirically best suited to
achieving results independently justifiable under one's favorite moral
theory. This assumes, of course, that the design itself does not trample
upon the theory's values or violate the theory's side constraints.
Dworkin's favorite moral theory is equality of resources, 9 and
Dworkin therefore advocates political institutions best suited to achieving equality of resources. 20 Equality of resources includes some opportunity to participate as a political actor for those who view such participation as a component of the good life. 2' Thus, design of the institu-

tions best suited to achieving equality of resources should take this
into account, ruling out, for example, benign dictatorships. Neverthe-

16.
17.

See Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part4: PoliticalEquality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1987).
Id. at 3.

18. Id. at 4.
19. See Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 283 (1981).
20. See id. at 291-92, 345.
21. See id. at 283-92 (devising an "equal auction" in which the participants receive equal
shares of the resources without regard to any previous hierarchy, and each person chooses his
or her life plan in light of the total amount of resources available to him or her).
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less, Dworkin's substantive conception of democracy might look very
"undemocratic" in other respects. It might lead one to design districts
of quite different sizes to give some interests more clout than others.
It would probably lead one to constitutionalize various rights that
would trump inconsistent laws favored by majoritarian institutions.
It might provide for a powerful judiciary to enforce rights provided
for within and without constitutional texts.
The second conception of democracy that Dworkin identifies is
what he calls the detached conception of democracy and what I shall
call the procedural conception of democracy.2 This conception is essentially a matter of equality of power over political decisions.2 It concerns
itself solely with input into decisions, not with the decisions themselves.2 1 A procedural conception would rule out deviations from "one
person, one vote," for example, even if the deviations more likely
would lead to electing a legislature likely to enact morally attractive
legislation.
B.

Vote Dilution and the Two Conceptions of Democratic Design
1. The Substantive Conception

If we accept the substantive conception of democracy as our standard for determining vote dilution, then a court must proceed in the
following manner whenever an individual or class brings a constitutional action premised on vote dilution. First, the court must ask what
kind of legislation is morally ideal.2 Second, the court must determine
whether the challenged districting plan is inferior to some alternative
districting plan in terms of the likelihood of producing a legislature
that will enact this morally ideal legislation. Third, if the court determines that the districting place is inferior by that standard, it must
then ask what interests will be hurt or slighted as compared to an
ideal districting place.26 Finally, the court must relate the wrong of
this deviation from an ideal districting scheme to some constitutional
provision. For example, while the equal protection clause seems an
appropriate constitutional peg on which to hang attacks on districting

22.
23.

See Dworkin, supra note 16, at 3.
See id. at 4.

24. See id.
25.

I pass over the troubling question of how that moral ideal relates to the actual Constitu-

tion and its text.
26. Presumably, those with standing to complain about the districting scheme will be those
likely to lose out vis-A-vis an ideal legislature and ideal legislation, even if their political party,

their race, etc., likely will win in their particular district.
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schemes that threaten "equality interests," is it the appropriate peg
for attacks on districting schemes that threaten other interests as well?
Or should all attacks on districting schemes be brought under the
umbrella of the heretofore nonjusticiable guarantee clause of article
IV?X
Although the substantive conception of democracy yields a conception of vote dilution, this conception is not an attractive candidate for
judicial enforcement under the Constitution for obvious reasons. For
example, why is the constitutional concern for morally ideal legislation
restricted to testing districting plans that are two steps away from
ideal legislation? If the Constitution is concerned with a morally ideal
legislative program, why is that concern not acted upon directly by
the constitutionalizing of such a program? And what constitutional
provisions embody this concern with ideal legislation through districting?
Beyond the textual problems are the institutional ones. Does anyone believe that the courts should proceed into moral theory and
political science as far as this conception of vote dilution requires? For
the courts to determine both the morally required political program
and the districting scheme most likely to produce it places courts far
deeper into the "political thicket" than even Justice Frankfurter could
have imagined in his darkest nightmares.2 Merely to describe this
conception of vote dilution sufficiently shows how alien is the judicial
role it assumes.2
In sum, the substantive conception of democracy does yield a determinate conception of vote dilution in the abstract. Or if "dilution"
seems to misdescribe the problem, perhaps "vote maldistribution" is
a more appropriate term. Terminology aside, however, the substantive
conception is neither one that easily relates to the constitutional text
nor one we would want judicially enforced.
2. The Procedural Conception
The procedural conception of democracy also yields a particular
conception of vote dilution. Under the procedural conception of democracy, every voter's vote should count equally, and the person or
proposal with the majority of votes should win. In other words, the
procedural conception of democracy yields the principle of "one person,

27. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912).
28. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
29. But cf. Beitz, Equal Opportunityin PoliticalRepresentation, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
155, 168-71 (N. Bowie ed. 1987) (endorsing just such a judicial role).
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one vote" and the related principle of majority rule. The Supreme
Court has already constitutionalized the principle of "one person, one
vote" under the equal protection clause.30 Therefore, the focus here
will be on majoritarianism and its implications for vote dilution.
The baseline for assessing vote dilution on a procedural majoritarian
conception is a situation in which a majority of voters within a jurisdiction agrees on all aspects of a legislative program and on all other
relevant qualities it would like its representatives to possess. In such
a situation, the procedural conception would demand a districting
scheme designed to elect legislators who would enact the majority
agenda and would possess the other characteristics relevant to the
majority. In other words, the ideal baseline is direct democracy by a
like-minded majority on all programs and personalities. Vote dilution
would consist of any legal impediment the majority met in having its
people elected and its programs passed. Vote dilution would constitute
a harm exclusively to the majority. For under the procedural conception, voters who turn out to be in the minority ideally should have
no influence on what is enacted and who is elected.
Now let us move from this imaginary world in which a majority
of voters agrees on everything relevant to voting to the real world
in which majorities shift depending upon the issue or personality under
consideration. In this world, the concept of vote dilution becomes
indeterminate. Given only the two constraints that all votes should
be given the same weight and that the majority should win, we cannot
now determine what legislative program should be enacted and what
representatives should be elected. If we cannot determine what personalities and programs 'the majority" would choose, we cannot determine the standard from which a deviation constitutes "vote dilution."
Failure to find a cohesive majority on all issues leads to this indeterminancy because of Arrow's problem.31 Briefly, Arrow proved that
democratic procedures for determining policy cannot avoid the possibility of the following dilemma. When the policy choices are A, B,
and C, and the voters are V 1, V2 , and V3 , it is possible for V 1 and
V2 to favor A over B; it is possible for V2 and V 3 to favor B over C;
and it is possible for V1 and V 3 to favor C over A. In such a situation,
majority rule produces indeterminate results.3 Every policy a majority
favors can be trumped by another policy another majority favors in
an endless cycle.
30.

See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,

379-8O (1963).
31.

K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-8 (2d ed. 1963).

32.
33.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
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Arrow's problem clearly haunts the legislative process, including
direct democracy, but how does it bear on vote dilution in a representative democracy? Recall that previously we attempted to measure
vote dilution by reference to an ideal situation in which a majority of
voters agreed on an entire legislative program and attributes of legislators. In the real world, of course, such a cohesive majority is unthinkable. Instead, we find that one majority of voters favors a certain
defense policy, a different majority favors a certain tax policy, a still
different majority favors a particular candidate, and so on. If we
operated on the basis of direct democracy, Arrow's problem may or
may not arise, depending upon whether the preferences of these different majorities are themselves transitive. Thus, if the majority that
favors, for example, a certain defense policy remains cohesive and
favors that policy above all alternatives, Arrow's problem will not
arise in a direct democracy.
Now consider the situation in a representative democracy. No matter how the district lines are drawn, the representatives elected will
not enact all the policies the different majorities favor, nor will they
possess all the other relevant characteristics the different majorities
favor. Some policies and personal qualities will inevitably lose out in
any representative democracy. The question now becomes, which ones
should lose?
This is where Arrow's problem surfaces. If the different majorities
are asked which policies and personalities they would most and least
regret to see defeated in the construction of a representative democracy, Arrow's problem almost certainly will arise. The very differences
among the voters that block the function of a single majority that
agrees on everything undoubtedly will block a stable set of meta-preferences regarding which majority-favored items should win and which
should lose. Only if we assume that a cohesive majority exists to say
how policies and personalities rank in importance - for example, that
the majority-favored foreign policy is more important than the majority-favored welfare program or the majority-favored tax program can we determine which districting arrangement a majority would
favor when every districting arrangement will thwart some majorityfavored policies.
Basing districting on the policies a direct democracy would produce
presents a further problem. Many voter preferences, especially those
relating to characteristics of representatives and not to general
policies, themselves depend on how voting districts are drawn.2 4 Thus,

34.

See Alfange, supra note 9, at 224.
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if I am in an ethnically homogeneous district, I might prefer a representative with qualities A, B, and C, whereas if I am in an ethnically
heterogeneous district, I might prefer a representative with qualities
X, Y, and Z. And even if I am in the majority on the issue of which
qualities are preferable in which districts, I may be in the minority
when it comes to choosing whether my district should in fact be ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous. Moreover, the latter choice
may have a majority that is itself divided on the importance of ethnic
homogeneity and heterogeneity in comparison to other related choices,
including the choice of representative qualities. Arrow's problem is
inevitable in attempting to achieve a stable set of majority preferences
about which other majority preferences should be honored and sacrificed in districting. And because Arrow's problem denies us an ideal
baseline of stable majority preferences, it prevents us from determining how to draw the districts.
The problem of drawing districts by reference to some ideal set
of majority preferences is really quite familiar. Suppose a state has
a majority of blacks or Democrats. Does that mean that votes have
been diluted if district lines are drawn, or multimember districts
created, that likely will lead to a predominantly white or Republican
legislature? The answer is obviously "no." Every individual voter who
happens to be black or who identifies herself as a Democrat may
prefer in the abstract that blacks or Democrats dominate the legislature. But every way of assuring that outcome may trample upon other
preferences on which individual blacks and Democrats are quite divided, and on which some of them join with individual whites and
Republicans to form a majority.-, Some individual blacks and Democrats may think the foreign policy that most whites or Republicans
favor is preferable to the one most blacks or Democrats favor. Some
may favor a different domestic policy from most other blacks or Demo-

35. This is, of course, the problem with systems of proportional representation of political
parties. See Beitz, supra note 29, at 164; Schuck, supra note 9, at 1367-77; see also Lowenstein
& Steinberg, supra note 9, at 14-16 (concern with gerrymandering must rest on a notion of
group rights, not on an extension of "one person, one vote"). Backstrom, Robins, and Eller
devise a test for political gerrymandering that essentially assumes that statewide success of the
voter's political party dominates all other concerns of the voter. Backstrom, Robins & Eller,
Partisan Gerrynmandering in the Post-Bandemer Era, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 285 (1987).
They measure ideal party strength by reference to a "base race," a statewide election the
outcome of which appears to have been determined solely by party affiliations, rather than
personalities or specific issues. Id. at 311. Their measure makes sense if you accept their
underlying assumption about the dominance of political party among the voter's concerns, but
they provide no persuasive reasons to accept that assumption.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 6
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

crats. Individual blacks and Democrats will like some individual white
or Republican candidates better than the individual black or Democratic candidates that other voting arrangements would likely produce.
And, of course, if they are in a minority, blacks, and Democrats will
split over whether they want to control a minority of legislative seats
or have great influence on a majority of legislative seats. We as individual voters are all blacks or nonblacks, Democrats or Republicans,
hawks or doves, pro-regulation or pro-market, pro-abortion or antiabortion, and so on. Moreover, we are divided in a vast number of
other ways, including over which particular people would be ideal
representatives. Thus, no districting plan is "better" or "worse" than
any other, if the terms "better" and "worse" refer to the people and
policies that a given plan will likely prefer, and if the terms reflect
evaluations based on the standard that majority preferences should
prevail.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Our version of democracy combines substantive and procedural
conceptions. The substantive conception is reflected in the various
constitutional rights and rules that trump pure majoritarianism and
in the institution of judicial review that enforces those rights and
rules. It is not reflected in a concern for the demography of electoral
districts. Even those who argue for judicial enforcement of rights not
located in the constitutional text focus on the products of legislation,
not on how the legislatures are selected. No court or commentator
has to my knowledge publicly advocated enforcing either textual or
nontextual rights through the roundabout method of specially tailoring
voting districts, as opposed to the direct method of the judicial veto
of legislation. Not only does the indirect method call for skills that
probably no one, much less the judiciary, possesses, it also has absolutely nothing to commend it over the direct method. Such a method
is not a sensible basis on which to premise judicial involvement in
legislative districting.
The procedural conception of democracy is reflected in the principle
of majoritarianism that is the default position in the electoral and
legislative processes. The procedural conception is also reflected in
the principle of "one person, one vote" that the Supreme Court, over
a strong dissent, has found inherent in the Constitution's equal protection clause.2 6 The procedural conception is likewise reflected in the

36.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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close scrutiny the Supreme Court gives to all restrictions on the franchise, and in its deference to congressional extensions of the franchise.",

When the Supreme Court and other courts move beyond doctrines
that concern the actual denial of the franchise or that deal with equality
in a quantitative sense and focus instead on qualitative equality, they
encounter an electorate that divides along a multitude of different
lines. As voters we are Democrats and Republicans, blacks and whites,
males and females. But we are also hawks and doves, redistributionists
and laissez-faire advocates. We are atheist, agnostic, Catholic, Pro-

testant, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist, all of various stripes. We are
trade unionists and managers, Main Streeters and cosmopoles. Some
of us prefer hot, charismatic candidates; others prefer cooler types.
Some of us prefer the well-educated or the well-bred. Others prefer
regular Joes and Joans. The list of our voting-relevant divisions is
virtually endless. Moreover, we are just as divided over how these
divisions rank in importance.

The upshot of this commonplace observation is that no standard
exists beyond the mathematical "one person, one vote" by which to
measure vote dilution3s We cannot say that anyone's votes are diluted

37. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (approving of section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 providing that no person who has successfully completed the sixth primary
grade in an American school in which the predominant language is other than English shall be
disqualified from voting under a literacy test); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
327-28 (1966) (approving of various remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). But
see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 129-30 (1970) (disapproving of amendment to the Voting
Rights Act of 1964 which mandated an 18-year-old voting eligibility requirement for state and local
elections).
38. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 4-5. The authors write:
In this Article we argue that there are no coherent public interest criteria for
legislative districting independent of substantive conceptions of the public interest,
disputes about which constitute the very stuff of politics. As we explain, this
position leads naturally to the following conclusions: that the courts ought not to
make the Constitution the arbiter of competing partisan redistributing claims; that
the establishment of nonpartisan commissions to take over the function of redistricting will have significant partisan consequences that have no special claim to fairness
or neutrality whether or not they are contemplated by the proponents of such
commissions; that such "nonpartisan" commissions, whose creation we oppose, must
be distinguished from "bipartisan" commissions; that the courts should adhere to
their express policy of leaving redistricting to the political branches of government
and intervene with their own plans only as a last resort and to as limited an extent
as possible; and that, although the process is admittedly often unattractive, those
who believe that they can remove the politics from redistricting, by adopting
"neutral" alternatives to the often fractious legislative treatment of the issue, are
pursuing an illusory goal.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 6
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

if Democrats, blacks, Teamsters, Rotarians, or Catholics are concentrated in a few voting districts, nor can we say that anyone's votes
are diluted if such groups are spread thinly among many voting districts 9 No person qua Democrat or black can show that a given
districting plan harms that person in the form of vote dilution. Or if
she can, then so can someone else with respect to any alternative
districting plan. If every plan dilutes votes in incommensurable ways,
40
we might as well say that no plan does.

What should the courts do, therefore, when confronted with evidence that voting districts have been designed - gerrymandered with race, party, or, even more typically, incumbency in mind? Four
possible responses suggest themselves. One response is that which
the Supreme Court gave in Davis v. Bandemer: If votes have been
intentionally diluted, then the plan is unconstitutional. I have attempted to demonstrate that because this approach requires a showing of
dilution, an impossible showing in a world in which the majority preferences are unstable in the way described by Arrow, the approach
should be abandoned.
A second response would be to cut motives loose from effects;
proof that the legislature considered certain factors in drawing district
lines would render the districting plan invalid irrespective of effects.
The rationale for this approach might be "the appearance of fairness."
Yet, such an approach is problematic for several reasons.
First, let us dismiss concern with the most common form of legislative gerrymandering, gerrymandering to protect incumbents. Such
gerrymandering may be unseemly, but it is not unfair to voters. That
under a different scheme a different majority of voters would have
elected a nonincumbent candidate may suggest that the nonincumbent's supporters have reason to regret the scheme. It does not
suggest, however, that the nonincumbent's supporters' votes have
been diluted. This is because no standard exists for determining which
of two or more candidates supported by different majorities should
be elected.
Second, why does racial or political gerrymandering appear unfair
once we understand that vote dilution cannot be determined? As noted

39. See Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts and FairRepresentation, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 666, 692-93 (1972); see also Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to AtLarge Elections: The DilutionProblem, 10 GA. L. REV. 353, 388-89 (1976) (dilution might not
exist because some candidate will court minority support, thereby including them in the election
process).
40.

Cf. R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND

POLITICS 462-63 (1968) ("all districting is gerrymandering").
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earlier, identical candy cannot be distributed in a way that gives
inferior ones to black or Republican children and superior ones to
others, no matter how hard one tries to do so.
Moreover, why invalidate only racial or political gerrymandering?
Why not invalidate schemes in which the legislature took account of
ethnicity, religion, economic class, voting behavior, ad infinitum? And
what is the remedy for such invalid gerrymanders? After all, every
alternative voting scheme could have been the result of a conscious
gerrymander and surely has the same potential for diluting votes.
Yet another problem this response presents is that of standing. If
we cannot determine whom a voting scheme actually hurts, who should
have standing to challenge it? Everyone? On what grounds would she
mount such a challenge? Could she do so under the equal protection
clause? To answer in the affirmative requires us to accept the absurd
conclusion that everyone can be treated unequally.
Consider one final problem with the response that motives should
be cut loose from effects. Would we be content to have the courts say
that, given two identically districted states with identical demographics, because of a difference in legislative motives, blacks or Democrats
or others suffer the harm of vote dilution in one state but not the
other? The position is incoherent.
A third possible response is to forget both legislative motives and
demographics and instead constitutionalize certain values in districting, such as compactness of districts and the integrity of political
boundaries. Any deviation from compact and politically coherent districts would be unconstitutional per se regardless of motive. Anyone
would have standing to complain. 41 Computers could then produce the
constitutionally required districting plan 2
Because I believe that no demonstrable harm results from gerrymandering regardless of its motivation, and thus that no demonstrable benefit derives from constitutionally mandating a particular type
of districting plan, I favor a judicial response to gerrymandering of

41.

The equal protection clause would be conceptually awkward as a constitutional peg

because not everyone can be denied equal protection simultaneously. Perhaps the guarantee
clause would be the appropriate source of this doctrine.
42.

Lowenstein and Steinberg argue that even compactness will favor particular political

interests over others. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 21-35. If my favored solution
of judicial withdrawal from gerrymandering cases is rejected, then I would hope that the courts

would impose a constitutional requirement that districts be drawn with a considerable amount
of randomness by computers. As importantly, they should be redrawn frequently to minimize
the chance that a policy favored by a statewide majority will be thwarted by districting over

the long run.
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doing absolutely nothing. "Vote dilution" in districts of equal numbers
of voters should be dropped from the pantheon of constitutional concerns. The Constitution warrants no judicial control of voting beyond
enforcing constitutional rights against majorities, policing the extension of the franchise, and mandating the numerical equality of voting
districts. Any further intrusion is judicial legislation that has neither
textual nor normative support of any other type. To pursue gerrymandering as the Supreme Court has begun to do is to enter the deepest
of political thickets, one in which substantive decisions will masquerade
as procedural ones.
One troubling rejoinder to my concern over judicial intervention
cases springs directly from my own critique. If on
gerrymandering
in
the procedural conception of democracy we have no principled basis
for attacking a gerrymandered districting scheme created legislatively,
then for the same reasons we have no basis on which to attack judicially
imposed districting schemes. If the judicial concern with gerrymanders
is an error, it is harmless error. The theoretical arguments contained
in this article undermine its practical point. 43
I have two responses to this contention. First, the prosecution of
gerrymandering lawsuits entails enormous court costs, costs that
might be far greater than those expended on legislative gerrymandering itself. Second, and much more serious, because judicial intervention
in gerrymandering cases cannot be justified on the basis of a purely
procedural conception of democracy, courts will in fact operate on the
basis of a substantive conception. They will impose this substantive
conception without warrant in the constitutional text. Moreover, they
will not even be fully aware that they are doing so, which will mean
that they will not have worked out this substantive conception and
fully justified it to themselves, much less to the public. They will be
acting completely politically, but with only the haziest political vision
and with no political accountability.
Of course, the legislatures' alternative districting schemes are political as well. But although the legislatures cannot claim that their
districting plans reflect the electorate's political preferences, and although a districting plan may thwart a majority's efforts to overturn
it once in place, legislatures still are more.accountable to the electorate
than are courts. Presenting alternative districting plans to the voters
directly through a referendum procedure is the only way to give the
substantive political choice of how to district the validation of the
procedural conception of democracy. In the absence of such a

43.

Chris Wonnell raised this objection in conversation.
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mechanism in our Constitution, the political choice of how to district
should be left to the imperfect but more accountable political
mechanism, the legislature.
Finally, some might agree that courts should stay out of the political
gerrymandering thicket, but, like O'Connor's concurrence in Davis, 44
distinguish racial gerrymandering as presenting a more compelling
case for judicial intervention. 45 Without question, race is central to
both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and legislative motives
directed at "weakening" the voting strength of blacks and other racial
minorities have a particularly odious odor and history. Nonetheless,
black voters are individuals and not a cohesive voting bloc. This is
especially true when blacks constitute a numerical majority among
the voters, and would otherwise have the potential for having their
votes "diluted." Identifying vote dilution, nondiluting remedies, and
individuals who plausibly can argue that their votes have been diluted
and thus that they have standing is as difficult in racial gerrymandering
as in political gerrymandering. Ending racial gerrymandering may
appear desirable because of the insulting thoughts that lie behind it,
although most racially motivated districting probably has more to do
with political rather than racial animosity. Regardless of the insult,
however, racial gerrymandering should probably not be deemed a
judicially cognizable constitutional offense.
44. Davis, 478 U.S. at 144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Chris WonneU pressed this argument in conversation.
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